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NOTES 
ANOTHER SMALL STEP FOR THE SECOND 
CIRCUIT MIGHT BE A GIANT LEAP FOR 
SECTION 43(A) OF THE LANHAM ACT 
DIRECTV is “one of the country’s largest satellite television service 
providers, with more than 15.6 million customers nationwide.”1 In the fall 
of 2006, DIRECTV began a “multimedia advertising campaign based on 
the theme of ‘SOURCE MATTERS,’”2 for its High Definition (HD)3 
technology television, featuring celebrities Jessica Simpson and William 
Shatner.4 The ads implied that DIRECTV HD technology was superior to 
that of “cable.”5
Time Warner Cable (TWC) is the second largest provider of cable 
television in the United States,
 
6 serving over 13.4 million customers 
nationally.7 Cable companies, including TWC, are allowed to operate 
through franchises obtained from local government entities.8 The only cable 
available in some markets—including almost all of New York City, is 
TWC.9 Therefore, “DIRECTV and other satellite providers pose the 
greatest threat to its market share.”10 Since DIRECTV broadcasts directly to 
customers via satellite, the company does not have the same franchise 
limitations that cable companies have.11 It is in direct and “extremely 
fierce” competition with the cable companies.12
                                                                                                                 
 1. Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 497 F.3d 144, 148–149 (2d Cir. 2007); David 
Pomerantz, Time Warner Cable Wins Advertising Decision vs. DIRECTV, THE N.Y. SUN, Aug. 
10, 2007, http://www.nysun.com/article/60242. 
 2. “The concept of the campaign was to educate consumers that to obtain HD-standard 
picture quality, it is not enough to buy an HD television set; consumers must also receive HD 
programming from the “source,” i.e., the television service provider.”  Time Warner Cable, 497 
F.3d at 149. 
 3. The FCC defines Advanced Television (ATV) to include any system that results in 
“improved [television] video and audio quality.” Tentative Decision and Further Notice of Inquiry 
in MM Docket No. 87-268, 3 F.C.C. Rcd. 6520, 6521 (1988). High definition television (HDTV), 
a subset of ATV, generally refers to systems that provide quality approaching that of 35 mm film. 
Id. HDTV “has a resolution of approximately twice that of conventional television in both the 
horizontal (H) and vertical (V) dimensions and a picture aspect ratio (HxV) of 16:9.”  ATSC 
Digital Television Standard at 5, cited in Federal Communications Commission Advisory 
Committee on Advanced Television Service Report (Nov. 28, 1995). 
 4. Time Warner Cable, 497 F.3d at 149. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 475 F.Supp.2d 299, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 7. See Pomerantz, supra note 1. 
 8. Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 497 F.3d 144, 149 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 9. Id.; see also Pomerantz, supra note 1 (“Time Warner Cable is the cable franchise holder 
for New York City, making it the only cable provider for most of the city.”). 
 10. Time Warner Cable., 497 F.3d at 149. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. See also Pomerantz, supra note 1 (“[C]ompetition between the two companies is 
fierce.”). 
  Additionally, “[s]atellite 
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companies such as DIRECTV . . . do not need to hold a franchise, and can 
provide service to any household with a dish.”13
TWC “offers both analog and digital cable television services to its 
subscribers,” while DIRECTV “offers 100% of its programming 
digitally.”
 
14 In order for customers of either service to receive HD 
programming, those customers must also acquire HD television equipment. 
To qualify as HDTV, the screen resolution must be classified as either 
720p, 1080i, or 1080p,15 but it is neither the cable providers nor the digital 
satellite television providers who set these standards.16 The non-profit 
organization Advanced Television Systems Committee (ATSC)17 “develops 
voluntary standards for all digital television, including HDTV.”18 
Television companies merely provide the requisite bandwidth to allow for 
the relevant level of resolution to be passed on to customers.19
Shortly after DIRECTV mounted its ad campaign, TWC brought suit 
seeking, among other things, a preliminary injunction enjoining DIRECTV 
from continuing to display the advertisements both on television and on the 
internet.
 DIRECTV’s 
ad campaign took advantage of the difference in services to attack TWC’s 
HD programming quality. 
20 The District Court concluded that TWC and DIRECTV both 
have “the same picture quality when it comes to HD programming,” 
although technically “analog cable service is inferior in certain respects to 
digital cable service, in part because a digital cable signal is less prone to 
corruption than an analog cable signal.”21 Subsequently, on February 5, 
2007 the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York 
issued a preliminary order enjoining DIRECTV from disseminating specific 
television commercials and internet advertising in any market where TWC 
provides cable service, which violated the Lanham Act on literal falsity 
grounds.22
                                                                                                                 
 13. See Pomerantz, supra note 1. 
 14. Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 475 F.Supp.2d 299, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 15. Id. As footnoted in the opinion, the “p” and “i” designations stand for “progressive” and 
“interlaced.”  “In the progressive format, the full picture updates every sixtieth of a second, while 
in the interlaced format, half of the picture updates every sixtieth of a second. The higher the ‘p’ 
or ‘i’ number, the greater the resolution and the better the picture will appear to the viewer.” Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. “The Advanced Television Systems Committee, Inc. is an international non-profit 
organization developing voluntary standards for digital television. The ATSC member 
organizations represent the broadcast, broadcast equipment, motion picture, consumer electronics, 
computer, cable, satellite, and semiconductor industries. ATSC creates and fosters implementation 
of voluntary Standards and Recommended Practices to advance terrestrial digital television 
broadcasting, and to facilitate interoperability with other media.”  See 
http://www.atsc.org/aboutatsc.html. 
 18. Time Warner Cable, 475 F.Supp.2d at 302. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 299. 
 21. Id. at 303. 
 22. Id. at 309. 
 On August 9, 2007 the Second Circuit upheld the District 
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Court’s injunction order as to the television advertisements, but reversed the 
order as to the internet advertisements, holding that the District Court erred 
in rejecting DIRECTV’s “puffery” defense as to those advertisements.23
In light of the past development of the Second Circuit’s interpretation 
of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,
 
24 Time Warner is another step in the 
wrong direction. Prior to this decision, the Second Circuit specifically 
declined to adopt the doctrine of false by necessary implication.25 The 
Second Circuit is stretching the literally false doctrine26 to include false by 
necessary implication.27 Here, once again, the court has expanded 
actionable claims under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.28 The decision in 
Time Warner states that although the ads in question do not unequivocally 
state that DIRECTV provides better image quality than TWC, the 
implication that they do so justifies TWC’s claims.29 Time Warner stands to 
be a landmark case in the Second Circuit’s Lanham Act interpretation. It is 
a case in which the plaintiff is benefiting from the Second Circuit’s 
common law interpretation of this act, and how this interpretation has 
evolved since the Act’s inception. The Lanham Act has come full circle and 
is now in direct opposition to the common law claim of false advertising as 
established in American Washboard v. Saginaw Manufacturing Co. in 
1900.30
The implications of Time Warner for the future of the Lanham Act are 
many. In reaching this decision, the Second Circuit expanded its already 
overreaching interpretation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. In view of 
the Second Circuit’s pattern of expansion, this decision could have 
 
                                                                                                                 
 23. Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 497 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 24. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 25. See Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc. v. Ciba Vision Corp., 348 F.Supp.2d 165, 182 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 26. See ‘Literally False,’ ‘Puffery’ Clarified in Advertising Dispute Between Cable, Satellite 
TV Providers, N.Y.L.J. Vol. 238, Aug. 15, 2001 (“Clarifying the false advertising doctrine, the 
appellate court held that an advertisement can be ‘literally false, even though it does not explicitly 
mak[e] a false assertion, if the words or images, considered in context, necessarily and 
unambiguously imply a false message.’”). 
 27. See Satellite TV Ads on HD Quality of Cable Are False, NAT’L. L.J. VOL. 29, NO. 51, Aug. 
20, 2007 (“The [Second] Circuit affirmed the injunction, modified parts of it for clarity and took 
the opportunity to clarify its position on claims of false advertising. Adopting the ‘false by 
necessary implication’ doctrine, the court concluded that the Simpson and Shatner ads were 
literally false, even though they do not explicitly make false assertions, because the words or 
images, considered in context, necessarily and unambiguously implied a false message that it is 
impossible to get the best picture from cable.”); see also Pomerantz, supra note 1 (“The Court of 
Appeals for the [Second] Circuit yesterday upheld a lower court’s decision in favor of Time 
Warner Cable and went a step further, saying the current legal standards for false advertising are 
too vague.”). 
 28. See Pomerantz, supra note 1 (“A legal dispute between [TWC] and DIRECTV over which 
company provides clearer high-definition image quality could prompt stricter court regulation on 
false advertising.”). 
 29. Id. 
 30. American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 F. 281 (6th Cir. 1900). 
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sweeping implications for other courts’ interpretation and application of 
section 43(a). Part I of this note will discuss the commercials at issue in this 
case. Part II will examine the facts and specific holdings in the Second 
Circuit Time Warner decision, and exactly how it departs from the Second 
Circuit’s prior application of section 43(a). Next, Part III will explore the 
history of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act and its development through 
case law. Part IV will explore the Second Circuit’s increasingly expansive 
conclusions about literal falsity. Part V will discuss the implications that 
this decision has for future litigation under this section, in light of a 
growing list of problems associated with section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 
Finally, Part VI will offer a few solutions. 
I. THE COMMERCIALS 
A. THE JESSICA SIMPSON COMMERCIALS 
The first commercial at issue, the “Original Simpson Commercial,” 
began airing on October 25, 2006.31 In the commercial, the actress Jessica 
Simpson wore a costume from her role as Daisy Duke in the movie The 
Dukes of Hazzard,32
Hey, 253 straight days at the gym to get this body and you’re not going to 
watch me on DIRECTV HD? You’re just not going to get the best picture 
out of some fancy big screen TV without DIRECTV. It’s broadcast in 
1080i. I totally don’t know what that means but I want it.
 and said: 
33
The commercial concluded with a narrator stating that “for picture 
quality that beats cable, you’ve got to get DIRECTV.”
 
34 Counsel for TWC 
contacted DIRECTV about the commercial on November 26, 2006, after it 
had been airing for just over a month.35 Two days later, DIRECTV agreed 
to revise the commercial,36 and began airing the revised commercial in 
December.37 The revised commercial was “identical to the Original 
Simpson Commercial,” except for the closing line by the narrator, which 
now stated that “for an HD picture that can’t be beat, get DIRECTV.”38
B. THE WILLIAM SHATNER COMMERCIALS 
 
Like the “Original Jessica Simpson Commercial,” the “Original 
William Shatner Commercial” went through revision.39
                                                                                                                 
 31. Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 475 F.Supp.2d 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 Both versions 
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featured William Shatner as Captain James T. Kirk from the television 
series Star Trek.40
Captain Kirk: What, I can’t use that line?
 The Original William Shatner Commercial aired on 
October 7, 2006, featuring a conversation which purported to take place 
aboard the Starship Enterprise: 
Mr. Chekov: Should we raise our shields, Captain? 
Captain Kirk: At ease, Mr. Chekov. Again with the shields. I wish he’d 
just relax and enjoy the amazing picture clarity of the DIRECTV HD we 
just hooked up. With what Starfleet just ponied up for this big screen TV, 
settling for cable would be illogical. 
Mr. Spock: [Clearing throat.] 
41
Again, a narrator concluded the commercial and stated that “for picture 
quality that beats cable, you’ve got to get DIRECTV.”
 
42 As in the revised 
Simpson commercial, in the revised Shatner commercial, the narrator’s 
closing line was changed to “for an HD picture that can’t be beat, get 
DIRECTV.”43
C. THE INTERNET ADVERTISEMENTS 
 
DIRECTV “also waged its campaign in cyberspace, placing banner 
advertisements on various websites to promote the message that when it 
comes to picture quality, ‘source matters.’”44 The internet advertisements 
began by “showing an image that is so highly pixelated [sic] that it is 
impossible to discern what is being depicted,” below the slogan “SOURCE 
MATTERS.”45 The screen then divided into two sides, with one side 
labeled “DIRECTV,” and the other side simply “OTHER TV.”46 The screen 
on the DIRECTV side was “exceptionally sharp and clear,” while the other 
side was “extremely pixelated [sic] and distorted.”47 Only once the screen 
split could one discern by looking at the DIRECTV side what the image 
actually portrayed.48
                                                                                                                 
 40. Id. 
 41. Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 497 F.3d 144, 150 (2d Cir. 2007); see also 
Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 475 F.Supp.2d 299, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 42. Time Warner Cable, 475 F.Supp.2d at 303. 
 43. Id. at 304. 
 44. Time Warner Cable, 497 F.3d 144 at 150. 
 45. Id. at 151. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. DIRECTV created two of these banner ads, the first featuring NFL football player Eli 
Manning and the second featuring women snorkeling underwater.  Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. 
DIRECTV, Inc., 475 F.Supp.2d 299, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 On its own website, in addition to the banner 
advertisements elsewhere on the internet, DIRECTV featured a 
demonstrative advertisement that followed the split screen format, and used 
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it to “compare the picture quality of DIRECTV to that of OTHER TV, 
which the advertisement later identified as representing ‘basic cable.’”49
If you’re hooking up your high-definition TV to basic cable, you’re not 
getting the best picture on every channel. For unparalleled clarity, you 
need DIRECTV HD. You’ll enjoy 100% digital picture and sound on 
every channel and also get the most sports in HD—including all your 
favorite football games in high definition with the NFL SUNDAY 
TICKET.
 On 
the top of the blurry side of the screen the following text appeared: 
50
II. ARGUMENTS PRESENTED AND FINDINGS OF THE SECOND 
CIRCUIT  
 
A. DIRECTV’S ARGUMENTS 
DIRECTV’s basic contention was that it provided a higher quality of 
HDTV programming when considering the entire spectrum of subscribers. 
DIRECTV claimed that the statement in the Revised Simpson commercial, 
“that ‘you’re just not going to get the best picture out of a television without 
DIRECTV’” was not proven false by TWC,51 because it “refers to the 
overall picture quality of DIRECTV on all of its channels since that is the 
only way to determine whether a consumer is getting the most out of their 
television.”52 DIRECTV pointed out that digital quality in general is better 
than analog53 and that according to TWC, forty-eight percent of TWC’s 
subscribers receive analog programming only, while DIRECTV transmits 
100% of its programming digitally to each of its customers.54
                                                                                                                 
 49. Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 497 F.3d 144, 151 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 50. Id. The website currently states the following: “By the end of October, DIRECTV will 
deliver over 70 HD channels. And by the end of the year, you’ll get up to 100 of the channels you 
really want to see in breathtaking HD.  That’s more than any other cable or satellite provider. If 
you want to see what your HDTV can really do, your choice is crystal clear: DIRECTV is the only 
source for the best HD. Get the most from your HDTV.  Only DIRECTV will give you up to 100 
of your favorite national channels in HD by year’s end. For the best HD, get DIRECTV.”  See 
http://www.DIRECTV.com/DTVAPP/global/contentPageNR.jsp?assetId=P4360042&CMP=ILC-
Q407-Film-100HD. 
 51. See DIRECTV, Inc.’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 4, 
Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2007) (No. 06 Civ.14245), 2007 
WL 672191. 
 52. Id. at 11. 
 53. Id. This was undisputed in the case and conceded by the Second Circuit: “There is no 
dispute, at least on the present record, that the HD programming provided by Time Warner Cable 
and DIRECTV is equivalent in picture quality.  In terms of non-HD programming, digital service 
generally yields better picture quality than analog service, because a digital signal is more resistant 
to interference.” Time Warner Cable, 497 F.3d at 149. 
 54. See DIRECTV, Inc.’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 11, 
Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2007) (No. 06 Civ.14245), 2007 
WL 672191. 
 Also, 
referencing a J.D. Power and Associates’ 2006 Residential Cable/Satellite 
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Satisfaction Study that found the same,55 DIRECTV concluded “that 
DIRECTV provides overall better picture quality is further established by 
the fact that consumers, television installers, and television manufacturers 
have all found DIRECTV’s picture quality to be better than cable.”56
DIRECTV likewise argued that the statement “for an HD picture that 
can’t be beat, get DIRECTV,” is not only a true statement,
 
57 but is 
“textbook puffery.”58 The commercial is true because the interpretation of 
the commercial is “at odds with the plain language of the statement,” which 
simply states that “no other service offers an HD picture that is superior to 
DIRECTV HD, not that DIRECTV HD is superior to all other HD.”59 Even 
if this assertion is a bit questionable because it could be implied that if 
DIRECTV can’t be beat, it is necessarily the best,60
B. TWC’S ARGUMENTS 
 DIRECTV’s puffery 
defense is persuasive and arguably should have been noted more by the 
Second Circuit. 
While conceding that no single statement in either the Revised Jessica 
Simpson Commercial or the Revised William Shatner Commercial was 
                                                                                                                 
 55. The 2007 version of this report states “DIRECTV ranks highest in customer satisfaction in 
three regions and WOW! ranks highest in one region among cable and satellite providers, 
according to the J.D. Power and Associates 2007 Residential Cable/Satellite Satisfaction Study 
released today.” For press release, see http://www.jdpower.com/press-releases/ 
pressrelease.aspx?id=2007137, posted Aug. 15, 2007. 
 56. See DIRECTV, Inc.’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 11–
12, Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2007) (No. 06 Civ.14245), 
2007 WL 672191. 
 57. Id. at 13. 
 58. Id. Puffery “is an exaggeration or overstatement expressed in broad, vague, and 
commendatory language, and is distinguishable from misdescriptions or false representations or 
specific characteristics of a product and, as such, is not actionable.” 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a) (West 
2006). 
 59. Id. at 14. 
 60. However, counsel for DIRECTV points to a strikingly similar case in which the District 
Court decided that such a statement is entitled to be interpreted just as DIRECTV claims it should. 
See DIRECTV, Inc.’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 13, Time 
Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2007) (No. 06 Civ.14245), 2007 WL 
672191 (citing Novo Nordisk A/S v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 997 F.Supp. 470, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 
1998)). In Novo Nordisk, defendant “claimed to offer ‘the finest and shortest insulin needle 
available in the U.S.,’” and although the court found that plaintiff’s needles were “equally fine and 
short,” the Court rejected plaintiff’s claim “that the statements were literally false, finding they 
only meant ‘no needle on the market is finer or shorter.’”  See id., (quoting Novo Nordisk, 997 
F.Supp. at 474). The Court concluded there that “[w]here, as here, more than one competitor 
produces the finest and shortest needle available on the market, the proper recourse for [plaintiff] 
is to compete in the market place with its own advertisements.” Id.  DIRECTV counsel assert that 
“[t]he same conclusion is compelled here. Because Time Warner Cable . . . cannot prove that its 
HD picture is superior to the JD picture offered by DIRECTV, Time Warner Cable cannot base its 
literal falsity allegation on this statement” under Novo. See DIRECTV, Inc.’s Opposition to 
Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 13, Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2007) (No. 06 Civ.14245), 2007 WL 672191. 
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false,61 TWC maintained that the Second Circuit should not “engage in 
disputatious dissection,” but should view the commercials as an “entire 
mosaic . . . rather than each tile separately.”62 TWC further argued that the 
Second Circuit should “look[] to the visual images in a commercial to 
assess whether it is literally false.”63
TWC did not argue that any specific statement in either revised 
commercial was literally false. As TWC noted, DIRECTV “removed the 
word ‘cable’ from the tag line of the Revised Jessica Simpson 
Commercial.”
 
64 Yet, TWC maintained that it was implied that the 
commercial still referred to cable since “cable remained DIRECTV’s 
primary competitor and the clear focus of the ad.”65 Similarly, the Revised 
William Shatner Commercial claimed that it would be “illogical for a 
consumer to ‘settle’ for cable’s HD services.”66 However, this claim made 
no specific assertions about the picture quality of DIRECTV in relation to 
that of TWC, rendering TWC’s claim that literal falsity was implied 
improper. Moreover, TWC conceded that “there is no single, discrete 
statement in the Revised William Shatner Commercial that contain[ed] the 
superiority claim at issue.”67 Instead, TWC urged the court to find that the 
ads contained literal falsity since “[t]he words were already there; they were 
simply in two sentences rather than one.”68 TWC also claimed that this 
interpretation did not “distort” or “convert” the language in the Revised 
William Shatner Commercial.69
Furthermore, while acknowledging that the District Court sided with 
TWC “in the absence of survey evidence as to the message consumers 
underst[ood] from the ads,”
 
70 TWC argued that it could still prove a 
likelihood of success on the merits “by showing that the advertising at issue 
[was] literally false as a factual matter.”71 TWC argued that the Lanham Act 
“encompasses more than blatant falsehoods,”72
                                                                                                                 
 61. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 21, Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., No. 07-0468 
(2d Cir. Apr. 13, 2007). 
 62. Id. at 22, (quoting S.C. Johnson, Inc. v. Clorox Co., 241 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 27, Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., No. 07-0468 
(2d Cir. Apr. 13, 2007). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 28. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 29. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 33, Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., No. 07-0468 
(2d Cir. Apr. 13, 2007). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 34. 
 and that, the advertisements 
at issue contain “blatant falsehoods,” rendering consumer survey evidence 
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unnecessary.73 However, as aforementioned, TWC conceded that no single 
statement in the commercials was singularly false.74
C. FINDINGS OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
 
In granting preliminary injunctions against the airing of the television 
advertisements at issue, the Second Circuit upheld the findings of the 
District Court. The Second Circuit held that the Revised Jessica Simpson 
Commercial’s assertion that a television viewer cannot get the best picture 
without DIRECTV would likely be proven false.75 Additionally, the court 
held that the fact that the Revised Jessica Simpson Commercial did not 
mention cable specifically was not dispositive, and that “[t]he presumption 
[of irreparable injury] is properly limited to circumstances in which . . . the 
plaintiff is an obvious competitor with respect to the misrepresented 
product.”76 Accordingly, the court concluded that the commercial 
“‘necessarily diminishe[d]’ the value of TWC’s product.”77
As for the Revised William Shatner Commercial, the Second Circuit 
concluded that, taken as a whole, it “unambiguously made the false claim 
that cable’s HD picture quality is inferior to that of DIRECTV’s.”
 
78
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE LANHAM ACT 
 
As several scholars note, the evolution of section 43(a) the Lanham Act 
in the sixty years since its enactment has been increasingly expansive.79 
One observer contends that “[w]hen section 43(a) of the Lanham Act was 
enacted . . . neither Congress nor then-President Truman could have 
predicted the dramatic effect it later would have on our national 
commerce.”80 An “entire body of case law” has developed that was 
virtually “non-existent in the 1940s.”81
                                                                                                                 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 21. 
 75. Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 497 F.3d 144, 154 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 76. Id. at 162, (citing Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Cosprophar, Inc., 32 F.3d 690, 694 (2d Cir. 
1994)). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 158. 
 79. See Bruce P. Keller, The Lanham Act After Fifty Years; It Keeps Going and Going and 
Going: The Expansion of False Advertising Litigation Under the Lanham Act, 59 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 131 (Spring 1996). See also Ross D. Petty, Competitor Suits Against False 
Advertising: Is Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act a Pro-Consumer Rule or an Anticompetitive 
Tool?, 20 U. BALT. L. REV. 381 (Spring 1991); Lee Goldman, The World’s Best Article on 
Competitor Suits for False Advertising, 45 FLA. L. REV. 487 (July 1993); David Klein, The Ever-
Expanding Section 43(a): Will the Bubble Burst?, 2 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 65 (Fall 1993); J. 
Thomas McCarthy, The Lanham Act After Fifty Years; Lanham Act Section 43(a): The Sleeping 
Giant Is Now Wide Awake, 59 SPG LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45 (Spring 1996). 
 80. See Keller, supra note 79. 
 81. Id. 
 In light of all this, a look at the 
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enactment of and subsequent caselaw on section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,82
A. COMMON LAW “PASSING OFF” 
 
most notably in the Second Circuit, is helpful. 
Before the legislature formally took note of and codified the claim of 
false advertising in section 43(a), “at common law, competitors could only 
obtain relief on a claim of false advertising if they could allege and prove 
“passing off,”83 wherein “the deception induces the public to buy the goods 
as those of plaintiff.”84 Two landmark cases from the early twentieth 
century exemplify the principle of “passing off,” and are important to 
understand these early courts’ conceptions of the claim of false advertising 
and their reluctance to expand its application.85
The first, decided in the Sixth Circuit in 1900, is American Washboard 
v. Saginaw Manufacturing Co.
 
86 There, the plaintiff, a manufacturer of 
aluminum washboards, brought suit against the defendant for 
manufacturing washboards which it falsely claimed to be aluminum.87 Even 
though the defendant did not claim to be selling the aluminum washboards 
sold and manufactured by the plaintiff, it was American Washboard’s 
contention that it was still “passing off” because the plaintiff enjoyed a 
monopoly on authentic aluminum washboards.88
We are not referred to any case, nor can we think of any reason why one 
who has obtained a monopoly in the material of which his goods are made 
should have any broader rights in protecting his trade-name than another 
who is engaged in competition in the same line of business . . . . [W]e are 
of opinion that complainant’s bill lacks the essential allegations necessary 
to make the case entitling it to the relief sought.
 The court’s conclusion as 
to the merits of this monopoly argument was unequivocal: 
89
As one scholar has noted, American Washboard “effectively cut off any 
expansion of federal unfair competition law in the area of false advertising 
for almost four decades, until the United States Supreme Court’s holding in 
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins wiped the slate clean”
 
90 by striking down the notion 
of a “federal general common law.”91
                                                                                                                 
 82. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125 (West 2006). 
 83. Robert S. Saunders, Replacing Skepticism: An Economic Justification for Competitors’ 
Actions for False Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 77 VA. L. REV. 563, 566 
(Apr. 1991). As noted by Saunders, the term “palming off,” was accorded the same meaning as 
“passing off” at the time. 
 84. American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 F. 281, 285 (6th Cir. 1900). 
 85. See Saunders, supra note 83, at 566. 
 86. American Washboard., 103 F. at 281. 
 87. Id. at 283. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id at 287. 
 90. See Saunders, supra note 83, at 566. 
 91. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
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The second important case in which a competitor plaintiff again sought 
to expand the claim of false advertising by arguing it should apply where a 
monopoly existed is Ely-Norris Safe Co.v. Mosler Safe Co., decided in 
1925.92 In that case, as in American Washboard, the plaintiff manufacturer 
alleged that the defendant was “passing off” because he enjoyed a 
monopoly on the goods at issue.93 The plaintiff sold and manufactured safes 
under a patent which were “distinctive because they contained an explosion 
chamber,”94 and claimed that defendant “manufactured safes in violation of 
the patent and duplicitously sold them with the appearance of having an 
explosion chamber,” while telling customers they in fact did have one.95
In perhaps the first instance of many in which the Second Circuit has 
displayed a tendency to expand the claim of false advertising, Judge 
Learned Hand “endorsed the monopoly analogy to passing off that 
previously had been rejected by . . . the Sixth Circuit”
 
96
[I]f it be true that the plaintiff has a monopoly of the kind of wares 
concerned, and if to secure a customer the defendant must represent his 
own as of that kind, it is a fair inference that the customer wants those and 
those only. . . . If a tradesman falsely foists on a customer a substitute for 
what the plaintiff alone can supply, it can scarcely be that the plaintiff is 
without remedy, if he can show that the customer would certainly have 
come to him, had the truth been told.
 in American 
Washboard: 
97
However, the Second Circuit’s attempt at expansion of the claim of 
false advertising was thwarted when the Supreme Court reversed Judge 
Hand’s decision two years later.
 
98
The next development in false advertising claims was accomplished 
through legislation soon after, yet was still very conservative. Under section 
 
                                                                                                                 
 92. Ely-Norris Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1925). 
 93. Id. at 603. 
 94. See Saunders, supra note 83, at 566, (citing Ely-Norris Safe Co., 7 F.2d at 603). 
 95. Id. 
 96. See Saunders, supra note 83, at 568. It should be noted that technically the first and most 
significant expansion of the role of federal courts’ application of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act 
was a decision of the Third Circuit. One scholar dubs L’Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 
214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954) the “seminal case in expanding the role of section 43(a).”  See Jeffrey 
P. Singdahlsen, The Risk of Chill: A Cost of the Standards Governing the Regulation of False 
Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 77 VA. L. REV. 339, 344 (Mar. 1991). 
Saunders likewise is of the opinion that the “Third Circuit was the first to reject the restrictive 
interpretation of section 43(a) and to give it the broader application that seems clearly indicated by 
its language.”  See Saunders, supra note 83, at 572. However, as will be shown the Second Circuit 
arguably took over the job of expanding the reach of section 43(a) and continues to do so, as 
evidenced in the case that is the subject of this note, Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 
497 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 97. Ely-Norris Safe Co., 7 F.2d at 604. 
 98. Mosler Safe Co. v. Ely-Norris Safe Co., 273 U.S. 132 (1927), rev’d 7 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 
1925). 
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3 of the Trademark Act of March 19, 1920,99 “the legal standard for unfair 
competition [was] very exacting, limiting liability to defendants who had 
willfully and with intent to deceive, affixed, applied, or annexed, or used in 
connection with any article or articles of merchandise . . . a false 
designation of origin.”100 Many unfair competition claims were precluded 
by the language of this statute.101 Overall, section 3 “had little legal 
impact.”102
B. PASSAGE OF THE LANHAM ACT 
 
After Erie took false advertising claims out of the federal arena by 
making them state actions, Congress enacted the Lanham Act in 1946.103 
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides a private right of action for false 
advertising claims in federal court,104 replacing what was formerly section 3 
of the Trademark Act of March 19, 1920.105
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services . . . uses 
in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any 
combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading 
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which—
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, 
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another 
person’s goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil 
action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be 
damaged by such act.
 Section 43(a) provides, in 
relevant part: 
106
As noted by several scholars,
 
107 “there is virtually no legislative history 
addressing [the] scope or purpose” of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act 
when it was passed, since it was considered “a relatively insignificant 
provision.”108 More importantly, “nothing in the legislative history . . . 
recognizes that a new and potent weapon against false advertising claims 
was being created.”109
                                                                                                                 
 99. Trademark Act of 1920, ch. 104, § 3, 41 Stat. 533 (1920). 
 100. See Keller, supra note 79. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See Klein, supra note 79, at 66. 
 103. Trademark Act of 1946, ch. 540, §§ 1-50, 60 Stat. 427 (1946). 
 104. See Singdahlsen, supra note 96, at 343. 
 105. Id. at 344. See also Trademark Act of 1920, ch. 104 § 3, 41 Stat. 533, 534 (1920). 
 106. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (emphasis added). It should be noted that this statute was revised in 
1988 to include the words “or another person’s” in section (B). 
 107. See, e.g., Singdahlsen, supra note 96, at 344; Joseph P. Bauer, A Federal Law of Unfair 
Competition: What Should Be the Reach of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act?, 31 UCLA L. REV. 
671, 679 (1984). 
 108. Id. 
 Also, “unlike section 3 [of the Trade-Mark Act], 
 109. See Keller, supra note 79. This scholar further notes that, “[t]o the contrary, the focus at 
the time was that section 43(a) provided an express statutory basis for prohibiting false 
designations of geographic origin, thus bringing U.S. law into conformity with the provisions of 
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which required a showing of willfulness and intent to deceive, section 43(a) 
is a strict liability tort.”110
C. EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF SECTION 43(A) 
 
In the first several years of the Lanham Act, section 43(a) “generally 
was construed as a codification of pre-Lanham Act law . . . restricted to 
actions for ‘passing off’ or actions which include only such false 
descriptions or representations as are of substantially the same economic 
nature as those which involve infringement.”111 The first significant 
expansion of its application began with the landmark case L’Aiglon 
Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc.112 which created a statutory tort of false 
representation of goods in commerce,113 allowing for a greater array of 
actionable claims. However, little further expansion occurred until three 
decades later. During the 1980s, “the law of false advertising as determined 
by federal courts’ interpretations of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act . . . 
departed sharply from earlier common law readings,”114 while at the same 
time the courts saw “a dramatic increase in the number of actions brought 
under section 43(a).”115
Two cases in the early 1980s marked important expansions in the 
application of section 43(a). First, in U-Haul Int’l v. Jartran, Inc.,
 
116 the 
Ninth Circuit upheld an earlier court’s award of $40 million in damages, 
half of which were punitive damages,117
                                                                                                                 
various international conventions to with the United States was a party.”  Id. at 132.  See also 
Klein, supra note 79, at 66 (“The enactment of section 43(a) was also motivated by international 
developments and interests.”). 
 110. See Singdahlsen, supra note 96, at 344. 
 111. See Ethan Horwitz & Benjamin Levi, Half a Century of Federal Trademark Protection: 
The Lanham Act Turns Fifty; Fifty Years of the Lanham Act: A Retrospective of Section 43(a), 7 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 59, 64 (Fall 1996). 
 112. L’Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954). 
 113. Id. at 651 (“We find nothing in the legislative history of the Lanham Act to justify the view 
that this section is merely declarative of existing law. Indeed, because we find no ambiguity in the 
relevant language in the statute we would doubt the propriety of resort to legislative history even 
if that history suggested that Congress intended less than it said. It seems to us that Congress has 
defined a statutory civil wrong of false representation of goods in commerce and has given a 
broad class of suitors injured or likely to be injured by such wrong the right to relief in the federal 
courts. This statutory tort is defined in language which differentiates it in some particulars from 
similar wrongs which have developed and have become defined in the judge made law of unfair 
competition.”). 
 114. See Saunders, supra note 83, at 563. See also Lillian R. BeVier, Symposium on the Law 
and Economics of Intellectual Property: Competitor Suits for False Advertising Under Section 
43(a) of the Lanham Act: A Puzzle in the Law of Deception, 78 VA. L. REV. 1 (Feb., 1992) (“In 
the last decade and a half, section 43(a) false advertising litigation has increased steadily.”). 
 115. See Singdahlsen, supra note 96, at 346. 
 116. U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 793 F.2d 1034 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 117. The court justified doubling the $20 million award under section 35 of the Lanham Act. 
See id. at 1037. 
 “based on U-Haul’s corrective-
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advertising-expenditures theory.”118 In the Second Circuit case PPX 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Audiofidelity Enterprises, Inc., the court also awarded 
damages.119 The court held that PPX “should not have been required to 
provide evidence of actual consumer confusion,”120 and remanded to the 
District Court for further proceedings on its damages claim.121 The Second 
Circuit cited the increasingly expansive application of section 43(a) as 
influential in its decision122 and, although it recognized that “courts have 
traditionally distinguished the standard that must be met to state a claim for 
injunctive relief from the standard necessary to establish entitlement to 
damages,”123
[W]e perceive no reason why the same logic should not apply in regard to 
claims for damages . . . [W]e see no need to require appellant to provide 
consumer surveys or reaction tests in order to prove entitlement to 
damages. . . . [T]he distinction drawn between stating a claim for 
injunctive relief and establishing entitlement to damages has less 
relevance in the context of [section 43(a)] false advertising: Having 
established falsity, the plaintiff should be entitled to both injunctive and 
monetary relief, regardless of the extent of impact on consumer 
purchasing decisions.
 it departed sharply from this tradition: 
124
                                                                                                                 
 118. Id. at 1041. The corrective-advertising-expenditures theory is a damages theory predicated 
on the idea that recovery of corrective advertising expenditures incurred by a plaintiff to 
counteract public confusion from a defendant’s wrongful conduct is warranted under section 35 of 
the Lanham Act. Big O Tire Dealers v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365, 1374 (10th 
Cir. 1977). 
 119. PPX Enter., Inc. v. Autofidelity Enter., Inc., 818 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 120. Id. at 268. 
 121. Id. at 273. 
 
 122. The court presented a lengthy list of expansive decisions that influenced its own here: (See, 
e.g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979) 
(misappropriating cheerleader uniform in sexually-explicit film); RJR Foods, Inc. v. White Rock 
Corp., 603 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1979) (imitating trade dress of established, competitive fruit punch); 
American Home Prod. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 577 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1978) (presenting false 
and misleading claims in comparative advertising of analgesics); Gilliam v. American Broad. 
Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976) (presenting garbled version of plaintiffs’ comedy program to 
public); Vuitton Et Fils, S.A. v. Crown Handbags, 492 F.Supp. 1071 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (distributing 
imitation Louis Vuitton handbags), aff’d mem., 622 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1980); Benson v. Paul 
Winley Record Sales Corp., 452 F.Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (deceptive marketing of old records 
of newly successful recording artist); see also, e.g., Camel Hair & Cashmere Inst. v. Associated 
Dry Goods Corp., 799 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1986) (mislabeling of coats that overstated their cashmere 
content); Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981) (substituting false name in film credits 
and advertising); Boston Prof’l Hockey Ass’n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., 510 F.2d 1004 (5th 
Cir. 1975) (unlicensed manufacturing of emblems and insignias of professional hockey teams). 
See PPX Enter., Inc., at 270–271. 
 123. See PPX Enter., Inc., at 271. Normally, for injunctive relief, “plaintiffs, must demonstrate 
a likelihood of deception or confusion on the part of the buying public caused by the false 
description or representation.” Id. See also Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Prod., Inc., 690 F.2d 312, 
316 (2d Cir. 1982). While, to establish “entitlement to damages for violation of section 43(a)” a 
plaintiff “must establish actual consumer confusion or deception resulting from the violation.”  
PPX Enter., Inc., 818 F.2d at 271. 
 124. PPX Enter., Inc., 818 F.2d at 272–273. 
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The import of these two decisions, as many scholars note,125
The next important evolution of section 43(a) came with the false 
advertising “prong,” which was added to section 43(a) by the Trademark 
Revision Act of 1988.
 and as will 
be discussed in depth herewith, is that section 43(a) is becoming more and 
more of a competitor tool and less of a necessary deterrent to false 
advertising or a means of consumer protection. 
126 “Pre-1988 judicial interpretations of section 43(a)  
. . . limited actionable false statements to claims about one’s own goods or 
services; consequently section 43(a) did not provide a cause of action for 
false statements or representations about a competitor’s goods or 
services.”127 The major effect of the Trademark Revision Act of 1988 was 
to expand section 43(a) to “include trade libel and product 
disparagement.”128 This change, “clearly enlarged the scope of section 
43(a)” beyond what it had been prior to the amendment,129 effectively 
placing a “congressional stamp of approval . . . [on] the Lanham Act 
metamorphosis.”130
“Once interpreted as prohibiting only passing-off, section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act has increased in scope to include infringement of common law 
marks, trade dress infringement, and false advertising—including trade libel 
and product disparagement.”
   
131 By the 1990s, “virtually all advertising 
claims made in interstate commerce—whether on product packages, in 
newspaper and magazine advertisements, in television or radio 
commercials, or disseminated through . . . the Internet—[fell] within the 
reach of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.”132 Section 43(a) is now 
extremely “broad and far-reaching.”133 Since it is a remedial statute, it 
“allow[s] the courts to adapt its language to changing commercial 
circumstances.”134  As will be demonstrated by this note, “[s]ection 43(a) 
has risen from obscurity as a largely ignored subsection of the Trade 
Registration Act . . . to today’s unrivaled legal instrument to combat unfair 
competition.”135 As predicted by one scholar136
                                                                                                                 
 125. See, e.g., Garrett J. Waltzer, Monetary Relief for False Advertising Claims Arising Under 
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 34 UCLA L. REV. 953 (Feb. 1987); James M. Keating, Jr., 
Damages Standards for False Advertising Under the Lanham Act: A New Trend Emerges, 20 
RUTGERS L.J. 125 (Fall 1988); Thomas J. Holdych, Standards for Establishing Deceptive Conduct 
Under State Deceptive Trade Practices Statutes That Impose Punitive Remedies, 73 OR. L. REV. 
235 (Spring 1994); Petty, supra note 79. 
 126. See Klein, supra note 79, at 69. 
 127. See Horwitz & Levi, supra note 111, at 71. 
 128. Id. at 72. 
 129. See Klein, supra note 79, at 69. 
 130. See McCarthy, supra note 79, at 46. 
 131. See Horwitz & Levi, supra note 111, at 72. 
 132. See Keller, supra note 79, at 131. 
 133. See Klein, supra note 79, at 87. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See McCarthy, supra note 79, at 46. 
 136. See Klein, supra note 79, at 88. 
 and evidenced in the case at 
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hand, it continues to expand, “and will continue to do so, on a case-by-case 
basis.”137
D. CURRENT ELEMENTS OF A SECTION 43(A) CLAIM 
 
Although the elements of a section 43(a) false advertising claim vary 
somewhat among jurisdictions, it is widely accepted that plaintiffs must 
establish “five elements: (1) a false statement of fact that has deceived, or 
has the capacity to deceive, a not insubstantial segment of the target 
audience, (2) affecting interstate commerce, (3) in connection with 
commercial advertising and promotion, (4) that is material, and (5) that is 
likely to cause injury.”138
IV. THE SECOND CIRCUIT COURT’S INCREASINGLY 
EXPANSIVE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT LITERAL FALSITY 
CLAIMS 
 The false statement of fact element is the central 
issue in the case at hand. 
A. PRIOR DECISIONS OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
Prior to Time Warner, the Second Circuit recognized that an 
advertisement, if literally false, could violate section 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act and “be enjoined without reference to consumer reaction,”139 and that 
falsity “extend[ed] to oral as well as visual claims.”140 Some courts went 
even further and recognized that, although “not all advertisements 
challenged under section 43(a) as literally false expressly state the alleged 
falsehood,”141 the advertisements could still be “false by necessary 
implication.”142 However, the Second Circuit had declined to follow the 
“false by necessary implication doctrine” until its decision in Time 
Warner.143
The prior standard in the Second Circuit provided that if an 
advertisement was not literally false, it would need to “have a tendency to 
mislead, confuse or deceive” to violate the statute.
 
144
                                                                                                                 
 137. Id. (It should be noted here that Klein also predicted correctly that “section 43(a) is likely 
to extend so far as to conflict with the underpinnings of patent and copyright laws.”). 
 138. See Keller, supra note 79, at 140–141. 
 139. See Keller, supra note 79, at 141, (citing McNeil-P.C.C., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 
938 F.2d 1544, 1549 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
 140. Id. at 141 (citing Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Prod., Inc., 690 F.2d 312, 317 (2d Cir. 
1982)). 
 141. See Keller, supra note 79, at 141. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc. v. Ciba Vision Corp., 348 F.Supp.2d 165, 182 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 144. See American Home Prod. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 577 F.2d 160, 165 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 Whether an 
advertisement was deceptive or misleading was generally determined not by 
“its tendency or capacity to deceive . . . but by reference to evidence 
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indicating that the public [would] be misled.”145 This evidence usually was 
presented in the form of consumer surveys.146 In fact, for years, “courts and 
commentators . . . focused almost exclusively on consumer survey results as 
the only probative evidence that an implicit claim . . . misled the public.”147 
This seems a very practical manner of determining whether such an implied 
claim of falsity actually deceived consumers.148 Yet, the District Court for 
the Southern District of New York formally expanded the scope of what it 
would examine when faced with such an implicit claim in McNeilab, Inc. v. 
American Home Prod. Corp.,149 which became the new standard of review 
for misleading or deceptive, yet true, statements. Although the McNeilab 
court maintained that a plaintiff “must adduce evidence (usually in the form 
of market research and consumer surveys) showing how the statements are 
perceived by those who are exposed to them,”150 the surveys’ conclusions 
are not binding on the court.151
Though the court’s own reaction to advertisements is not determinative, as 
finder of fact it is obliged to judge for itself whether the evidence of record 
establishes that others are likely to be misled or confused. In doing so, the 
court must, of course, rely on its own experience and understanding of 
human nature in drawing reasonable inferences about the reactions of 
consumers to the challenged advertising.
 The court could also consider its own 
reaction to the statements: 
152
The Second Circuit readily adopted this new viewpoint, when in 
LeSportsac, Inc. v Kmart Corp.
 
153 it took the position that consumer 
surveys are not required at all to prevail in a section 43(a) action.154 The 
Second Circuit later held in Johnson & Johnson Merck Consumer Pharm. 
Co. v. Smithkline Beecham Corp. that the presumption that consumers are 
being deceived “may be engendered by the expenditure of substantial funds 
in an effort to deceive consumers and influence their purchasing 
decisions,”155 and if this presumption arises, it “relieves a plaintiff of the 
burden of producing consumer survey evidence that supports a claim.”156
                                                                                                                 
 145. See Keller, supra note 79, at 141; see also American Home Prod., 577 F.2d at 165 (“It is    
. . . well established that the truth or falsity of the advertisement usually should be tested by the 
reactions of the public.”). 
 146. See Keller, supra note 79, at 141. 
 147. Id. at 142. 
 148. But see id., in which one scholar notes that “[a]lthough it is clear that consumer survey 
evidence at times may be the most persuasive evidence of an advertisement’s tendency or capacity 
to deceive, it should not be the exclusive means of assessing implicitly false representations.” 
 149. McNeilab, Inc. v. American Home Prod. Corp., 501 F.Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
 150. Id. at 525. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Lesportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 154. Id. at 78. 
 
 155. See Johnson & Johnson Merck Consumer Pharm. Co. v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 960 
F.2d 294, 298–299 (2d Cir. 1992). This opinion further states that “once a plaintiff establishes 
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Under the “false by necessary implication doctrine,” a district court 
evaluating whether an advertisement is literally false must analyze the 
message conveyed in full context, i.e., it must “consider the advertisement 
in its entirety and not engage in disputatious dissection.”157 In an effort to 
clarify the false advertising doctrine, the appellate court held that “an 
advertisement can be ‘literally false, even though it does not explicitly 
mak[e] a false assertion, if the words or images, considered in context, 
necessarily and unambiguously imply a false message.’”158
B. THE DECISION IN TIME WARNER IS A DEPARTURE FROM THE 
COURT’S PREVIOUS DECISIONS 
 
In a case such as Time Warner, the Second Circuit’s prior decisions that 
the court could consider its own perceptions159 and no longer required 
consumer surveys160 are problematic. This is especially so since TWC 
sought both injunctive relief and an accompanying award for damages 
here.161 In such an action, a finding of literal falsity to support injunctive 
relief is prejudicial when coupled with a damages claim. In most cases, 
such a finding is likely to force settlement of the damages claim. The 
import of this result is that defendants are not only deprived of having 
customers or market researchers weigh in on the deceptive nature of the 
advertisements, but of the benefit of having a jury decide whether the 
advertisements are literally false to support a damages claim. The Second 
Circuit’s adoption of the “false by necessary implication” doctrine here 
goes one step further, mandating a finding of falsity based solely on the 
court’s perception of the advertisement in its context and entirety.162 And, 
when dealing, as here, with television advertisements, the court’s 
presumption of deception based on the expenditure of substantial funds163
                                                                                                                 
deceptive intent, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate the absence of consumer 
confusion.” Id. at 299. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 497 F.3d 144, 157 (2d Cir. 2007). (citations 
omitted). 
 158. See ‘Literally False,’ ‘Puffery’ Clarified in Advertising Dispute Between Cable, Satellite 
TV Providers, N.Y.L.J. Vol. 238, Aug. 15, 2001 (quoting in part Time Warner Cable, 497 F.3d at 
149). 
 159. See Keller, supra note 79, at 141 (citing McNeil-P.C.C., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 
938 F.2d 1544, 1549 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
 160. See Lesportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 161. See Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, 2007 WL 672192 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 17, 2007). 
 162. See Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 497 F.3d 144, 157 (2d Cir. 2007). 
(citations omitted). 
 163. See Johnson & Johnson Merck Consumer Pharm. Co. v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 960 
F.2d 294, 298–299 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 is 
equally problematic, since this will be the case with virtually all television 
advertisements. 
2008] A Giant Leap For Section 43(A) of the Lanham Act 145 
The decision in Time Warner also lessened the required showing for 
irreparable harm here,164 which goes to the element of causation of injury to 
the plaintiff. It is well recognized that a plaintiff need not prove the 
existence of an injury caused by the defendant to prevail in a section 43(a) 
action.165 A plaintiff must provide proof of a “reasonable basis for the belief 
that the plaintiff is likely to be damaged as a result of the false 
advertising.”166 To do so, a plaintiff must demonstrate that it, and 
defendant, are “competitors in a relevant market,”167 and that there is “a 
logical causal connection between the alleged false advertising and its own 
sales position.”168 Although in Time Warner the court required a showing of 
“irreparable harm,” which would seem to be a higher standard than “likely 
to be damaged,” the court’s basis for finding such harm seems even more 
relaxed than its basis for finding likely harm previously. In Time Warner, 
Judge Chester J. Straub, writing for the panel,169 said that “[t]he likelihood 
of irreparable harm may be presumed where the plaintiff demonstrates a 
likelihood of success in showing that the defendant’s comparative 
advertisement is literally false and that given the nature of the market, it 
would be obvious to the viewing audience that the advertisement is targeted 
at the plaintiff, even though the plaintiff is not identified by name.”170
A third holding, though less important to the analysis in this note, is 
that “[t]he category of non-actionable ‘puffery’ encompasses visual 
depictions that, while factually inaccurate, are so grossly exaggerated that 
no reasonable consumer would rely on them in navigating the 
marketplace.”
 There 
need not be any showing whatsoever of a causal connection between the 
alleged false advertising and its own sales position. It seems that, in effect, 
proof of literal falsity here almost mandates a finding of irreparable harm. 
171
                                                                                                                 
 164. See Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 497 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2007); see also 
Beth Bar, 2nd Circuit Seeks the Truth in Ad Dispute, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER Vol. 236, No. 
30, Aug. 13, 2007. 
 165. See Johnson & Johnson v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 631 F.2d 186, 190 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 166. Id. The court also distinctly noted that “[i]f such a showing is made the plaintiff will have 
established a reasonable belief that he is likely to be damaged within the meaning of s[ection] 
43(a) and will be entitled to injunctive relief, as distinguished from damages, which would require 
more proof.” Id. This is significant since many cases involving claims based on television 
commercials today, including Time Warner, are cases in which both injunctive relief and damages 
are sought simultaneously. This lesser standard of proof with regard to damages is applied to the 
injunctive portion of the suit, and the result often forces settlement of the damages portion of the 
suit, effectuating a de facto application of the lesser standard of proof to the damages claims. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. See Bar, supra note 164. 
 170. See Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 497 F.3d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 171. Id. at 148. 
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V. IMPLICATIONS INVOLVED WITH THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S 
NEW INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 43(A) OF THE 
LANHAM ACT 
There are several implications involved with the Second Circuit’s latest 
interpretation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, to be discussed herein. 
To begin, the evolution of this Act’s interpretation increasingly favors 
plaintiffs. As such, instead of protecting consumers, the Act has become a 
tool for competitors. Moreover, the more often suits are filed under the Act, 
the more costs of advertising are rising, further reducing the benefits of 
advertising to consumers. Finally, consumers and defendants alike are 
harmed when plaintiffs are able to prevail on the merits in a preliminary 
injunction action, forcing settlement without trial on a concomitant 
damages claim. 
A. PLAINTIFFS ARE INCREASINGLY FAVORED IN SECTION 43(A) 
CLAIMS 
As a result of the expanding interpretation of what an actionable claim 
is under section 43(a), currently several aspects of section 43(a) litigation 
are preferential to plaintiffs. Time Warner is another resounding example of 
this trend. First, as exemplified by Time Warner, plaintiffs no longer must 
show that the public actually believed the statements in the challenged 
advertisements.172 Second, the burden of proof is not actual harm.173 As a 
result, a plaintiff is merely required to show that plaintiff and defendant are 
actually competitors.174 In such a situation, a defendant can be found liable 
under section 43(a) for unfair competition without even naming the 
plaintiff.175 Third, courts rush straight to judgment for the plaintiff on a 
lowered standard for injunctive relief, without considering whether there 
exist differing interpretations when literal falsity applies.176 In the end, 
many cases are forced into settlement.177
                                                                                                                 
 172. See Time Warner Cable., 497 F.3d at 153. “When an advertisement is shown to be literally 
or facially false, consumer deception is presumed, and the court may grant relief without reference 
to the advertisement’s actual impact on the buying public.”  See also Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana 
Prod., Inc., 690 F.2d 312, 317 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 173. Time Warner Cable, 497 F.3d at 161. (Internal quotations omitted). “We have resolved 
that a plaintiff need not point to an actual loss or diversion of sales to satisfy this requirement.” 
 174. Id. at 162. “The presumption of irreparable injury is properly limited to circumstances in 
which injury would indeed likely flow from the defendant’s objectionable statements, [for 
example] . . . [when] the plaintiff is an obvious competitor with respect to the misrepresented 
product.”  See also Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Cosprophar, Inc., 32 F.3d 690 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 175. Time Warner Cable, 497 F.3d at 162. “[T]he fact that the commercial does not name 
plaintiff’s product is not necessarily dispositive.”  Id. 
 176. See McCarthy, supra note 79, at 74. For further discussion, see infra note 214, and 
accompanying text. 
 177. See Arthur Best, Monetary Damages for False Advertising, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (Fall 
1987). 
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B. CLAIMS OF UNFAIR COMPETITION WILL MORE OFTEN BE USED 
AS A COMPETITOR TOOL AND NOT FOR CONSUMER 
PROTECTION 
There is a definite trend in Lanham Act section 43(a) toward its use as a 
competitive tool, and away from its use for true consumer protection.178 As 
attorneys saw section 43(a)’s potential for supporting claims, they “began 
pushing the courts to apply it to more and different types of false 
advertising and unregistered trademark infringement. The federal 
[judiciary] . . . responded enthusiastically.”179 It has become a “much-used 
and potent statute,” for attorneys and competitors alike.180 “In recent years, 
there has been a dramatic increase in the number of such suits brought by 
competitors.”181 On the heels of the 1988 revision, one scholar wondered 
whether “section 43(a) [would] be used anticompetitively to quash 
advertising to the detriment of consumers,”182 since competitors have a 
“much stronger incentive to sue” than consumers.183 Yet, it was also noted 
that, as is relevant here, competitors “presumably have greater expertise 
than consumers concerning the quality of the goods in question and how 
consumers are likely to interpret advertising claims. Therefore, they can 
more readily identify and prove false advertising claims.”184 However, this 
“competitors as experts” phenomenon in the false advertising arena is a 
dangerous and slippery slope, as evidenced in Time Warner, wherein the 
interpretation of literal falsity was once again expanded. It has also been 
argued that “smaller competitors, unable to match the advertising 
expenditures of larger firms, may find it less expensive to challenge the 
advertising content of the larger firm in court than to mount a counter-
advertising campaign.”185 However, as evidenced here, in the plethora of 
drug-company actions of late, and in cases such as U-Haul,186 which 
quashed a small competitor,187
As evidenced by the popularity of claims between drug companies in 
this arena, it is clear that they incentivize competitor suits. One scholar 
notes that “[e]stablished companies, particularly those selling parity 
products, often find it beneficial to stretch the truth. For example, some 
commentators have estimated that every 1% increase in market share 
created by advertising for over-the-counter drug companies increases sales 
 it is usually the big competitors waging 
these wars and knocking out other big competitors. 
                                                                                                                 
 178. See McCarthy, supra note 79, at 52. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. See Goldman, supra note 79, at 488. 
 182. See Petty, supra note 79, at 381–382. 
 183. Id. at 382. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 383. 
 186. U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 793 F.2d 1034 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 187. Id. 
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by $15 million.”188 He further notes, “[i]t is inevitable that some consumers 
will be misled by commercial advertising. Given the time and space 
limitations of the various media outlets, advertising copy is necessarily 
incomplete.”189
“As competitors continue to expand the limits of section 43(a) by using 
the statute to monitor how rivals market their products through advertising, 
increasingly interesting legal issues will arise . . . One thing is clear: The 
expansion of false advertising law will keep going, and going, and going     
. . . .”
 
190 Today, “the proper use and scope of section 43(a) has become an 
important issue in the traditional battle between the competing policies of 
fair competition and free competition. Before passage of the Lanham Act, 
such issues were largely played out in the context of state common law. 
[Now], the battleground is section 43(a).”191
In addition, seeking injunctive relief is relatively quick and cheap for 
plaintiffs, whereas in many cases it is extremely disruptive to the 
defendant.
 
192 Therefore, a competitor can succeed in enjoining an 
adversary’s advertising “within months or even weeks of filing suit,”193
Time Warner is a prime example of using section 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act as a competitor tool. DIRECTV counsel argued quite persuasively that 
“the motivation behind [TWC’s] Motion for Preliminary Injunction is not to 
enjoin false and misleading advertising, as it contends.”
 
which is obviously extremely costly to television advertisers, and another 
competitive incentive to file such suits. 
194 “Rather, [TWC] 
seeks to impermissibly prevent DIRECTV from engaging in truthful, 
accurate commercial speech regarding the nature of its products and 
services so that [it] can obtain a competitive advantage in the 
marketplace.”195 DIRECTV further contended that TWC “cannot point to a 
single statement . . . that is literally false,”196 nor has TWC shown 
“evidence of actual consumer confusion” to prove that the advertisements 
are “likely to mislead.”197
                                                                                                                 
 188. See Petty, supra note 79, at 388. 
 189. See Goldman, supra note 79, at 488 n.2. 
 190. See Keller, supra note 79, at 157. 
 191. See McCarthy, supra note 79, at 74. 
 192. See Petty, supra note 79, at 392. 
 193. Id. 
 194. See DIRECTV, Inc.’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 4, 
Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2007) (No. 06 Civ.14245), 2007 
WL 672191. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 Furthermore, as noted by DIRECTV, the Second 
Circuit had not adopted the “doctrine of falsity by necessary 
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implication,”198 so TWC’s attempt to argue that the “overall message of the 
advertisements is literally false”199 was misplaced.200
Counsel for DIRECTV argued in its Second Circuit briefing that TWC 
“concedes, as it must, that none of the advertisements makes any actual 
comparison between DIRECTV’s HD programming and that of cable.”
 
201
DIRECTV alleged that TWC’s true motivations for seeking preliminary 
injunctions in the case were to “attempt to exercise editorial control over all 
of DIRECTV’s advertisements.”
 
This makes it impossible for the literally false argument to hold. Therefore, 
the Second Circuit needed to expand its interpretation of section 43(a) to 
include and adopt the doctrine of false by necessary implication. 
202 This motivation is exemplified by the 
fact that TWC “agreed not to sue DIRECTV over the Jessica Simpson 
commercial if DIRECTV changed the tagline to remove reference to cable  
. . . .  Yet . . . after DIRECTV made the only change requested by TWC, it 
ask[ed] th[e] Court to enjoin the revised commercial.”203 DIRECTV 
counsel argued that the “scope of the requested injunction [was] hopelessly 
overbroad, vague and unconstitutional,” since it sought not only “to enjoin 
the advertisements at issue,” but asked the Court “to issue a blanket 
injunction preventing DIRECTV from engaging in any future advertising 
that may criticize Time Warner Cable’s or cable’s picture or audio quality 
in any form, even concededly inferior analog, regardless of the truthful 
nature of such advertisements.”204 Further, “the First Amendment prohibits 
Time Warner Cable from silencing its competitors from truthfully 
informing the public of the deficiencies in its products and services.”205 
Also, counsel pointed out that TWC was at the time engaging in the very 
same activity it sought to enjoin by “running its own advertisements falsely 
stating that DIRECTV is obsolete and prone to excessive outages.”206
                                                                                                                 
 198. Id.  See also Johnson & Johnson Vision Care Inc. v. Ciba Vision Corp., 348 F.Supp.2d 
165, 182 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 199. See DIRECTV, Inc.’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 4, 
Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2007) (No. 06 Civ.14245), 2007 
WL 672191. 
 200. Counsel for DIRECTV referred to another District Court decision to make the assertion 
that “[s]hould the Court even consider the doctrine of necessary implication, Time Warner Cable 
must show that the Revised Simpson Commercial is ‘susceptible to no more than one 
interpretation’ and that this interpretation is false.” (emphasis added)  See id. at 14, (quoting 
Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharm. Co. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 285 F.Supp.2d 389, 
391 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)). See also Ciba Vision, 348 F.Supp.2d at 182–184. 
 201. See DIRECTV, Inc.’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 4, 
Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2007) (No. 06 Civ.14245), 2007 
WL 672191. 
 202. Id. at 5. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
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Overall, it is clear that TWC’s motivation in filing this suit was not to 
protect consumers, but to injure its competitor DIRECTV. TWC took 
advantage of the Second Circuit’s liberal interpretation of section 43(a) of 
the Lanham Act, and was even successful in expanding that interpretation. 
C. COSTS OF ADVERTISING WILL RISE, REDUCING THE BENEFITS 
OF ADVERTISING TO CONSUMERS 
Expansion of the enforcement of section 43(a) is not “cost-free”: it 
“may chill useful, informative advertising; often involving significant 
litigation costs; and may produce anticompetitive results.”207 It is well 
recognized that “[i]nformational advertising increases buyer knowledge 
about the price, quality and benefits of various products, thus reducing 
consumers’ search costs and the total costs to consumers of transacting 
business.”208 And, advertising “induces sellers to improve the quality of 
their goods.”209 “Advertising may also reduce barriers to entry [into the 
market] and improve product offerings by allowing the new entrant to 
quickly gain market awareness and acceptance.”210
Despite one scholar’s conclusion that “although the variety of 
alternative enforcement mechanisms reduce[s] the need for competitor 
actions, competitor actions provide benefits that no other policing tool 
provides,”
 
211 he also notes that alternative enforcement mechanisms are 
many: Consumers, the Federal Trade Commission, State Attorneys General, 
the National Advertising Review Board, and the television networks are all 
alternative enforcement mechanisms.212 Accordingly, “[i]t is important to 
create critical breathing space for legitimate comment and criticism about 
products and services. On the other hand, there is a need for a meaningful 
state or federal remedy against intentional falsification of facts about a 
product that demonstrably causes a loss of sales.”213
                                                                                                                 
 207. See Goldman, supra note 79, at 490. 
 208. Id. at 491. 
 209. Id. at 492. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 491. 
 212. Id. at 504. 
 213. See McCarthy, supra note 79, at 74. 
 In the case at hand, 
there was no evidence presented to suggest that there was intentional 
falsification of facts or that there would be any loss of sales, since none was 
required. 
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D. NO ACTUAL HARM NEED BE SHOWN FOR A PLAINTIFF TO BE 
AWARDED DAMAGES, WHILE THE THREAT OF A LARGE 
DAMAGE AWARD WILL FORCE SETTLEMENT 
Even though a plaintiff must show “actual consumer confusion or 
deception”214 to get money damages, judges may award double or treble 
damages without the plaintiff having to demonstrate any intent to defraud or 
malicious interference with business practices.215 “While the usual remedy 
obtained is an injunction, occasionally large damage awards have been 
recovered,” including huge punitive damage awards.216 Until U-Haul, 
“most plaintiffs who allege[d] false advertising violations under the 
Lanham Act [were] only able to enjoin defendants from falsely 
advertising.”217 The allowance of damages has created a “tremendous 
incentive for firms to aggressively litigate Section 43(a) false advertising 
claims.”218 This also arguably forces settlement, which is not necessarily 
good or fair to the defendant. In fact, a settlement, the terms of which are 
undisclosed,219 did result in this case, separate and apart from the equitable 
portion of the suit,220 and a spokesperson for TWC confirmed in press 
reports that it “came several weeks before” the Second Circuit upheld the 
District Court judge’s preliminary order “that DIRECTV stop airing 
televised ads featuring Jessica Simpson and William Shatner, because they 
seemed misleading.”221 Further, as noted by DIRECTV and TWC officials, 
“their settlement made the ruling moot.”222
                                                                                                                 
 214. Normally, for injunctive relief, “plaintiffs must demonstrate a likelihood of deception or 
confusion on the part of the buying public caused by the false description or representation.”  PPX 
Enter., Inc. v. Autofidelity Enter., Inc., 818 F.2d at 271. See also Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana 
Prod., Inc., 690 F.2d 312, 316 (2d Cir. 1982).  While, to establish “entitlement to damages for 
violation of section 43(a)” a plaintiff “must establish actual consumer confusion or deception 
resulting from the violation.” PPX Enter., Inc., 818 F.2d at 271. However, as noted herein, this 
standard was relaxed in the Second Circuit in PPX Enter. See id. at 272. 
 215. See U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 793 F.2d 1034 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 216. See McCarthy, supra note 79, at 57 (“One of the largest awards in any false advertising 
case was the $40 million award in the 1986 U-Haul case in the Ninth Circuit. Finding the 
defendant a commercial privateer engaged in predatory false comparative advertising, the court 
awarded $20 million in damages and another $20 million in increased and punitive damages, plus 
attorney fees.”). 
 217. See Waltzer, supra note 125, at 979. 
 218. Id. 
 219. See Bar, supra note 164  (“Jade L. Ekstedt, DIRECTV’s public relations manager, and 
Alexander Dudley, senior director for corporate communications at Time Warner Cable, 
confirmed that the parties have reached a settlement. Both, however, declined to elaborate on its 
terms.”); “Time Warner Cable Settled a lawsuit against DIRECTV alleging . . . ,” CONSUMER 
ELECTRONICS DAILY, Aug. 10, 2007 (“DIRECTV and Time Warner Cable officials . . . wouldn’t 
disclose the terms [of their settlement].”). 
 220. See Bar, supra note 164. 
 221. See “Time Warner Cable Settled a lawsuit against DIRECTV alleging . . . ,” CONSUMER 
ELECTRONICS DAILY, Aug. 10, 2007. 
 222. Id. 
 However, “the written decision 
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may have wider implications for other companies deciding how to portray 
competitors in their advertising.”223
VI. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
The decision in Time Warner will only serve to incentivize competitors 
and encourage not only more lawsuits, but more competitive commercials. 
Although competitive advertisement has several advantages for consumers, 
those advantages come not from competitors pointing fingers at each other, 
but from providing information to the public about products and services 
that they offer, whether new to the market or old. The Second Circuit’s 
approach in Time Warner “likely will result in decreased information to the 
consuming public about alternative brands and new products, which rely 
heavily on advertising to create a market share.”224
Cynda E. D’Hondt
 Courts should be 
conscious of the new competitive tools that they give with each new 
expansion of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act and realize that litigation in 
this arena has really come full circle. After seeing big business march in 
time and again and quash new entries into the market, courts, and especially 
the Second Circuit, should tighten their interpretation of section 43(a) and 
consider the import their decisions will have on the marketplace and 
individual consumers. Section 43(a) should strive to protect consumers—
not big businesses like TWC. 
 
*
                                                                                                                 
 223. See Larry Neumeister, Appeals Court Upholds Ad ‘Puffery’ Warner Had Sued DIRECTV 
For Distorting Its Service, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 10, 2007. 
 224. See Waltzer, supra note 125, at 973. 
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